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Governments presumably institute regulatory systems to serve the inter-
ests of the public. Sometimes, however, the interests of individual regula-
tors may diverge from those of the public.' For example, because regu-
lated industries typically are better organized than the consumers of their
products or services, a regulator may maximize his political support by
serving the interests of the regulated industry instead of consumer inter-
ests. Pluralist commentators on this regulatory dilemma have suggested
that subjecting regulators to greater public accountability would reduce
the incentives for such behavior.' They recommend that, since specialized
political interests have less influence over the elective process than over
appointments, regulators should be elected rather than appointed."
This Article assesses this recommendation in the context of the electric
utility industry, which is regulated in part by state public utility commis-
sions (PUCs). In general, public utility commissioners are appointed by
the governor of a state. However, several states have recently considered
proposals to institute public elections of utility commissioners." This legis-
lative activity results primarily from the harsh attacks PUCs have sus-
tained in recent years from competing interest groups. One group argues
that, unless PUCs are more responsive to the financial problems of elec-
tric utilities, the industry will continue to underinvest in cost-effective
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1. The Stigler-Peltzman model of regulation, for example, views the regulator as a politician who
attempts to maximize constituent support. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.
L. & ECON. 211 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Lazarus, Halfway Up From Liberalism: Regulation and Corporate Power, in CORPO-
RATE POWER IN AMERICA 215 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973); A. Sharpless & J. Jasinski, Wis-
consin's Public Service Commissioners: Should They be Elected or Appointed? 25-26 (1981) (Citizens
Utility Board Report).
3. See A. Sharpless & J. Jasinski, supra note 2, at 25-26.
4. See infra notes 38, 39 and accompanying text. Commissioners currently are elected in nine
states: Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and
South Dakota. ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS RESOURCE COUNCIL, STATE ELECTRICITY PROFILES 3, 11,
39, 71, 95, 103, 135, 143, 163 (1981).
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generating capacity, perhaps resulting in power shortages before 1990.'
This group maintains that current public utility regulation does not allow
utilities to earn a "fair" rate of return." An opposing group argues that
PUCs have been unsympathetic to the welfare of ratepayers and have al-
lowed electric utilities "excessive" rate increases.7 They contend that
PUCs have not paid sufficient attention to the prudence of utilities' ex-
penditures or to whether rapid rate increases inflict too much hardship
upon low-income consumers.8 Recent developments in the electric utility
industry, such as costly cancellations of nuclear and coal generating
plants, have shaken the financial stability of many utilities9 and have ex-
acerbated this conflict among competing groups. 0
The evidence presented in this Article suggests that supplanting ap-
pointed PUCs with elected PUCs will not lead to lower electricity prices
for consumers, contrary to the belief generally held by supporters of
elected PUCs. The first section of the Article briefly reviews previous
studies of the commissioner selection process. The second section presents
new evidence of the effect of elected commissions on electricity rates."
This evidence is based on historical data from 1973 through 1980. The
third section attempts to explain why electricity rates generally are lower
in states which elect their PUCs than in states which appoint them. It also
discusses an additional piece of evidence suggesting the undesirability of
electing regulators: the perception of investment houses that public elec-
tion of PUCs creates an unfavorable regulatory climate.
5. See, e.g., Dubin & Navarro, The Effect of Rate Suppression on Utilities' Cost of Capital, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Mar. 31, 1983, at 18; Sillin, Herod & Shaw, Jr., Reagan Economics and Electric
Utilities: Will Rate Actions Limit Benefits?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 5, 1982, at 15.
6. The Department of Energy (DOE) has recently criticized state public utility commissions for
providing inadequate rate relief to electric utilities. See ELECTRICITY POLICY PROJECT, U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC POWER IN AMERICA: ECONOMIC SUPPLY FOR ECONOMIC
GROWTH ES-17-18 (1983) [hereinafter cited as ELECTRICITY POLICY PROJECT). DOE warns that
shortages of generating capacity and higher rates from the operation of economically obsolete power
plants may occur because of the inability of utilities to raise adequate capital funding. See id. at ES-
21-22.
7. See, e.g., Hinds, Citizen Utility Boards Hunt Industry White Elephants, N.Y. Times, June 6,
1982, at E8, col. 3.
8. See, e.g., id.
9. See Simmons, The Nation's Nuclear Trials, FIN. WORLD, June 13-26, 1984, at 13.
10. See Johnson, Why Electric Power Growth Will Not Resume, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 14,
1983, at 19.
11. This Article, as well as most other studies on this topic, does not address the question of
which selection process would better foster economic efficiency. The exception is the Smiley and
Greene study, infra note 28, which explicitly examines whether the decisions of elected PUCs better
accord with the economic standard of effective regulation than those of appointed PUCs.
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I. Overview of the Literature
Several studies have sought to explain, among other things, why the
price of electricity is lower in states with elected commissions than in
states with appointed commissions. Most of these studies begin by asking
the fundamental question: "Does the election of commissioners result in
lower electricity rates to individual groups of ratepayers?" Generally, the
next step in such studies is developing a mathematical model employing
the different variables that the authors believe affect the price of electric-
ity. These variables usually include the costs of inputs for producing elec-
tricity, the various characteristics of the demand for electricity, and the
regulatory and political situation.' 2
Although some of the studies provide weak evidence that the election of
commissioners accounts for the lower electricity prices observed in states
with elected commissions, the studies are often inconclusive and sometimes
contradict each other. A study by Crain and McCormick, using state data
from 1967, found that residential electricity prices were twelve percent
lower in states with elected commissions when demand and supply condi-
tions were controlled. 8 The study also found that elected commissions ac-
counted for lower industrial rates. 4 Basing their model on the general
theory of regulation,' 6 Crain and McCormick treated politicians and pro-
ducers as one interest group, consumers as a competing interest group,
and regulators as a separate competing interest group, with each group
pursuing the maximization of its own wealth." A study by Mann and
Primeaux using data from 1979 also produced some evidence that the
election of commissioners had a dampening effect on electricity rates.'
7
12. The general model applied in these studies is
Pi = I(CT, DD, REG),
where Pi is the average price for the ith customer class (e.g., residential); CT and DD include the cost
and demand determinants ofprice, respectively; and REG comprises commission and political charac-
teristics (e.g., term of commissioners, selection process of commissioners) that might affect price. The
symbol f indicates that price is a function of these factors.
13. See W. Crain & R. McCormick, Regulators as an Interest Group 28-31 (1978) (University of
Rochester, Working Paper Series No. 8004).
14. Id. at 32. In this study, the coefficient of the dummy variable representing the method of
commission selection was significant at the 10% level of significance in the residential and industrial
price equations, using the two-stage least squares regression results.
The statistical analyst uses the concept of a "percent level of confidence" because he takes only a
sampling of the available information in his area of study. When a statement is made at a particular
percent level of confidence, it means that if a large number of samples were taken, the statement
would be correct in the stated percentage of cases. A variable is said to be significant at a certain level
when it does not equal zero at that level of confidence. For a more thorough explanation of confidence
levels (and statistical analysis in general), see T. WONNACoTr & R. WONNACOTr, INTRODUCTORY
STATISTICS 141-48, 187-93, 297-99 (1972) (discussing "interval estimation" and "hypothesis testing").
15. The formal development of the general theory of regulation is contained in Peltzman, supra
note 1.
16. See W. Crain & R. McCormick, supra note 13, at 1-2.
17. See P. Mann & W. Primeaux, Regulator Selection and Electricity Prices 16 (1982) (Univer-
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Other studies have shown contrary results, however. A study by Pelsoci
showed that, for 1975, the election of commissioners may have led to
higher residential electricity rates." Moreover, recent studies by Harris
and Navarro,' and by ICF, Inc.,2° contradict the view that elected com-
missions significantly restrained rates during the period following the oil
embargo.
Other studies have looked at the effects of PUC selection methods on
other variables that either directly or indirectly affect electricity rates.
These variables include the allowed rate of return on equity, the percent-
age of requested rate increases allowed, the relative cost of capital, and
overall "regulatory effectiveness." An important study by Hagerman and
Ratchford developed a political-economic model to explain differences in
the allowed rates of return on equity among electric utilities for the year
1975. " The authors included the method of selecting commissioners as an
explanatory variable. Their results surprisingly showed that ". . .whether
or not commissioners are elected does not affect return on equity. This is
inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that elected commissioners are
responsive to the public interest, i.e., give lower returns. 22
A study by Gormley examined the effects of administrative and political
sity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Faculty Working Paper No. 887). The empirical results of the
Mann and Primeaux study, however, are unimpressive. Only five out of the 30 regression models that
were estimated (10 regression runs for each of the three years) showed the method of selection varia-
ble to have the expected sign at a statistically significant level (at the 95% or 99% confidence level).
See id. at table 4. Two of the 1967 equations (monthly typical bills for medium size residential and
small commercial customers) predicted that an elected commission would increase electricity prices
with a level of confidence of either 95% or 99%. See id. at table 2. Further, some of the other variables
had unexpected signs. For example, the 1979 average revenue equations predicted an inverse relation-
ship between average revenue and distribution expenses per kwh sales and a direct relationship be-
tween system scale (i.e., utility plant) and average revenue. See id. at table 4.
18. See Pelsoci, Organizational Correlates of Utility Rates, in ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL IS-
SUES: THE MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 101, 111 (M. Steinman ed. 1979).
Pelsoci does not lay a theoretical foundation for the inclusion of the selection method variable. Similar
to other analysts studying this issue, he expects an elected commission to hold down rates. To his
initial surprise, his results show that the election of commissioners may lead to higher residential
rates. Pelsoci then rationalizes his unexpected result by postulating that, because elected commission-
ers are less educated and professionally oriented than their appointed counterparts, they are more
susceptible to influence by utility interests.
19. Harris & Navarro, Does Electing Public Utility Commissions Bring Lower Electric Rates?,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 1, 1983, at 23, 26, 27.
20. ICF, Inc., A Statistical Analysis of the Effect of Commission Selection Method and Other
Commission Attributes on the Statewide Cost of Electricity 15-22 (Feb. 1983) (report prepared for
the Edison Electric Institute).
21. See Hagerman & Ratchford, Some Determinants of Allowed Rates of Return on Equity to
Electric Utilities, 9 BELL J. ECON. 46 (1978). The authors' model contains several variables, includ-
ing the following: measure of risk of investment in electric utilities; debt-equity ratio; salaries of com-
missioners; terms of office of commissioners; and total assets. The data for the model were obtained
from responses to a survey of 87 utilities and 42 commissions and from several other sources.
22. Id. at 54.
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factors on rate case decisions and PUC policies. 3 Gormley applied his
"public advocacy" model to utility data to explain differences in the per-
centage of rate increase requests granted by elected and appointed PUCs.
He included the method of selecting commissioners in his model and
found that the selection method was not a significant factor in predicting
the percentage of rate increases granted by commissions during 1977 and
1978.24
Other studies indirectly examining the effect of elected commissions on
electricity prices have shown that, in the long run, elected commissions
may lead to a "poor regulatory climate" rating by investment houses.
This, in turn, can lead to higher rates for electricity consumers. Navarro
has developed a model that accounts for the effects of ideological, institu-
tional, and political variables, including the effect of public election -of
commissioners on regulatory climate.25 In a study based on 1978 data,
Navarro found that a change from an appointed to an elected commission
would increase the probability of the investment community's giving a
utility an "unfavorable regulatory climate" rating from twenty-one per-
cent to sixty-two percent.2 Dubin and Navarro later estimated that a
shift in the regulatory climate from a more favorable rating to a less
favorable one would increase the cost of equity for an average utility by
2.28 percentage points.27 The major implication of Navarro's studies is
that, even if elected commissioners tend to keep electric rates down in the
short term, rates may rise more than otherwise in the long term because of
the adverse effect of elected regulators on regulatory climate. An unfavor-
able regulatory climate rating may make it difficult for utilities to obtain
23. See Gormley, Policy, Politics, and Public Utility Regulation, 27 AM. J. POL. SCl. 86 (1983).
Gormley's regression model contains the following explanatory variables: grassroots advocacy, proxy
advocacy, regulatory resources, political culture, and method of commission selection. Id. at 95. These
variables are supposed to affect specific commission policies based on a theory of public advocacy. Id.
at 91-92. Gormley uses a sample of 89 electric utilities for which rate case decisions were made during
1977 and 1978. Id. at 94-95.
24. See id. at 95, table 2.
25. See Navarro, Public Utility Commission Regulation: Performance, Determinants, and Energy
Policy Impacts, ENERGY J., Apr. 1982, at 119, 123, 133. In addition to the selection method of com-
missioners, the other political variables are the sources of funding of commissions, the percentage of
oil used by utilities to generate electricity, and the length of terms of commissioners. Institutional
variables are specified as the salary structure of commissioners, commission qualifications, and com-
mission expenditure level. The ideological variables are represented by a regional dummy variable
and the percentage of commissioners who are Democrats. Id. at 125-28.
26. Id. at 133.
27. See Dubin & Navarro, Regulatory Climate and the Cost of Capital, in REGULATORY REFORM
AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 141, 143 (M. Crew ed. 1982). Dubin and Navarro developed a composite
ranking based on the rankings of Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, Valueline, and
Duff and Phelps. See also Trout, The Regulatory Factor and Electric Common Stock Investment
Values, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 22, 1979, at 28. Trout found that an unfavorable regulatory climate
had an adverse effect on the market-to-book ratio of electric and combination electric/gas utilities for
the year 1976.
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the capital necessary for investment in cost-effective generating facilities,
or may increase the cost of such capital.
Finally, a study by Smiley and Greene produced results which conflict
with the conclusions of the Navarro studies."8 Their study, based on 1970
data, suggests that electric utilities regulated by elected PUCs enjoy a
more favorable regulatory climate than those regulated by appointed
PUCs. For example, utilities regulated by elected PUCs tend to have
higher market-to-book ratios than their counterparts regulated by ap-
pointed commissions. 9
In summary, past studies of the effects of electing commissioners have
produced conflicting results. Some studies provide weak evidence that
elected PUCs tend to keep electric rates down, while others reach the op-
posite conclusion.
II. New Evidence
This section offers new empirical evidence on the economic effect of the
PUC selection process. It first presents the results of the author's re-
estimation of the Mann-Primeaux, Crain-McCormick, and Pelsoci models
using more recent data. The results raise questions about the soundness of
some earlier studies because they indicate that the PUC selection method
has no effect on electric rates. The section next discusses recent evidence of
the effect of the PUC selection process on the structure of electricity rates,
that is, the relative prices of electricity to residential, commercial, and in-
dustrial customers. This evidence suggests that, contrary to what one
might expect, elected commissions do not favor residential customers any
more than appointed commissions do.
A. Re-estimating the Models with New Data
Mann and Primeaux observed that "there is some evidence that elected
regulators have a constraining effect on electricity rates."' 0 A re-estima-
tion of Mann and Primeaux's model with 1980 data, however, produces
28. See Smiley & Greene, Determinants of the Effectiveness of Electric Utility Regulation, 5
RESOURCES & ENERGY 65 (1983). The major part of the study measured the level of effectiveness of
regulators in the following areas: setting average rates distant from those of an unregulated monopo-
list; structuring rates based on marginal costs; and allowing utilities to earn normal profits. Id. at 67-
70.
29. See R. Smiley & W. Greene, Determinants of the Effectiveness of Electric Utility Regulation
26-27, table 4 (1978) (Cornell University, Working Paper No. 172). The market-to-book ratio was
greater than one for all but two of the 72 utilities studied. See id. Taken together, these results give
some support for the inference that elected commissioners allowed utilities to earn above-normal prof-
its to a greater degree than did appointed commissioners (other things held constant).
30. Mann & Primeaux, supra note 17, at 15.
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contrary results.3  Although the evidence obtained by Mann and
Primeaux suggested that the average electricity price for residential cus-
tomers was directly related to the appointment of commissioners, the re-
gression results using 1980 data (admittedly a smaller sample) indicate
that no significant relationship exists between the method of commissioner
selection and the average electricity price. Table 1 compares the regression
results for the residential average price equation obtained by Mann and
Primeaux (column 1) with the re-estimated model using 1980 data (col-
umn 2)." The t-ratios (in parentheses) for the selection method variable
(COMM) show that the method of selection was statistically significant in
the original regression, but was not statistically significant in the re-
estimation.
31. Thirteen of the 82 utilities selected serve customers in elected states. The sample comprises the
large electric utilities in each of 46 states. Nebraska has been excluded from this study because it has
no investor-owned utilities. Tennessee has been excluded because it has only one small electric utility
subject to state regulation. Virginia and South Carolina have been excluded because their utility com-
missioners are elected by the state legislature, making it unclear whether these commissioners are
elected or appointed. Particular utilities were excluded if they served two or more states with different
PUC selection processes. For example, Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company was excluded from the
sample even though it is the largest utility serving Oklahoma. The service area of the utility includes
part of Arkansas (an appointed state), as well as Oklahoma (an elected state). Finally, some utilities
were excluded from the data set because there were not adequate data for their inclusion in the
models.
The Mann-Primeaux model is specified as
P. = I(SS, DC, TX, PC, COMM),
where Pi = average revenue per kwh for the ith customer class or the monthly typical bill for elec-
tricity; SS = net electric utility plant; DC - total distribution expenses per kwh sales; TX = total
tax payments (sum of income tax and other taxes) per kwh sales; PC = total production expenses per
kwh sales; and COMM = dummy variable representing method of commission selection (0 =
elected, 1 = appointed). Mann & Primeaux, supra note 17, at 11-12.
The data for the variables used in the re-estimation of the model came from the following sources:
for Pi, see ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STATISTICS OF PRI-
VATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1980 ANNUAL 227-60 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1980 ANNUAL]; for SS, see id. at 371-470; for DC and PC, see id. at 227-366; for TX, see
id. at 120-87; and for COMM, see STATE ELECTRICITY PROFILES, supra note 4.
The regression results for all of the equations estimated for this article are on file with the Yale
Journal on Regulation and can be obtained upon request.
32. In re-running the Mann and Primeaux general model using various electricity price variables
(e.g., commercial rates, industrial rates, typical bills), no regression produced a dummy variable coeffi-
cient (representing the effect of selection method) that was statistically significant at the 90% level or
higher. Furthermore, the coefficent of determination (R': the proportion of the total variation in the
explained variable that is explained by the explanatory variables) does not change at all with the
inclusion of the dummy variable in any of the estimated regression equations. Somewhat surprisingly,
no problem of multicollinearity (a relationship between two or more explanatory variables) was de-
tected. The exclusion of the dummy variable had little effect on the estimated coefficients and the
standard errors of the other explanatory variables in the models. The estimated coefficients and the t-
ratios for the average residential revenue per kwh equation excluding the dummy variable, for exam-
ple, are comparable with those when the dummy variable is included in the equation. A t-ratio is the
estimated coefficient divided by its standard deviation, a measure of the extent of variation of the
sample data. It can be used to measure the statistical significance of the coefficient and, thus, of the
variable.
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TABLE 1
Estimations of the Mann-Primeaux Modela
1979 *  1980
Constant Term 1.55 2.11












Including COMM 0.78 0.84
Excluding COMM - 0.84
F Value 74.0 80.8
N 113 82
aVariables: net electric utility plant (SS); total distribution expenses per kwh (DC); total tax pay-
ments per kwh sales (TX); total production expenses per kwh sales (PC); and dummy variable for
commission selection (0 = elected, I = appointed) (COMM) The dependent variable is average
revenue per kwh for residential customers.
bNumbers in parentheses are t-ratios.
*Source: P. Mann & W. Primeaux, Regulator Selection and Electricity Prices, Table 4 (1982) (Uni-
versity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Faculty Working Paper No. 887).
Re-estimating the model used by Crain and McCormick with data for
1973 and 1980 again reversed the original conclusion. The original study
showed that elected commissions had a downward effect on electricity
prices for the year 1967. Re-estimation of the model, however, fails to
support this conclusion. Table 2 compares the regression results for the
residential average price equation obtained by Crain and McCormick
(column 1) with those obtained from the modified model using 1973 data
(column 2) and 1980 data (column 3).88 The t-ratio for COMM, using
33. See W. Crain & R. McCormick, supra note 13, at 28. The Crain and McCormick model, as
specified in their paper, had serious statistical problems. The main problem was collinearity between
their load factor (LF) and the proportion of residential customers (PRORES). The model was thus
modified for use in this Article. LF was replaced with a different explanatory variable, RHG (pro-
portion of total generation from hydro sources). The new model achieved stronger statistical results (in
a linear form as opposed to a logarithmic form). The modified model retains the reduced form supply
and demand character of the original model. It is specified as:
Pi - IPINC, RHG, FC, RRC, RG, COMM),
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the original model and 1967 data, provides weak support for the claim
that elected PUCs were responsible for lower rates. As in the case of the
Mann and Primeaux model, however, the new regressions reverse the
original conclusion. The t-ratios associated with COMM for both 1973
and 1980 indicate that the method of selecting commissioners had no sta-
tistically significant effect on price.
where P. = average revenue per kwh for the ith customer class; PINC = per capita personal income
(in 1972 dollars); RHG = proportion of total generation from hydro sources; FC = cost of fossil fuel
per net kwh; RRC = proportion of average ultimate customers that is residential; RG = net genera-
tion per kilowatt of installed generating capacity (nameplate); and COMM = dummy variable repre-
senting method of commission selection (0 = elected, 1 = appointed).
The 1973 data for the variables used in the estimation of the modified model came from the follow-
ing sources: for P., see FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC
UTILITIES IN THEUNITED STATES 1973, at 401-28 (1974); for RHG, see id. at 701-28; for PINC, see
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
380, table 611 (95th ed. 1974); for FC, see EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK OF
THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY FOR 1973, at 51, table 43 S (1974); for RRC, see id. at 39, table
30 S; for RG, see id. at 9, 24, tables 4 S and 15 S; and for COMM, see NATIONAL ASS'N OF
REGULATORY UTIL. COMM'R, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT ON UTIL. AND CARRIER REGULATION 210-42
(1978) [hereinafter cited as 1977 ANNUAL].
The 1980 data for the variables used in the re-estimation of the model came from the following
sources: for Pi, see 1980 ANNUAL, supra note 31, at 227-60; for RHG, see id. at 477-543; for PINC,
see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 429, table 715 (102nd ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as ABSTRACT]; for FC, see EDISON ELEC-
TRIC INSTITUTE, STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY/1980, at 35, table 26
(1981) [hereinafter cited as YEAR BOOK]; for RRC, see id. at 47, table 42; for RG, see id. at 11, table
4; and for COMM, see STATE ELECTRICITY PROFILES, supra note 4.
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TABLE 2
Estimations of the Crain-McCormick Modela
1967* 1973b  1980
Constant Term .911 -1.67
PINC 0.037 0.019 0.023
(0.11)c (1.80) (1.08)
RHG 0.12 -1.28 -3.53
(LF) (0.60) (-3.91) (-4.58)
FC 0.20 1.11 0.557
(4.61) (3.40) (4.66)
RRC -2.32 -0.99 6.28
(-1.25) (-0.03) (0.83)
RG -0.025 0.053 -0.205
(-0.62) (1.57) (-1.15)
COMM -0.38 0.093 0.040
(-1.62) (0.58) (0.10)
R2  0.44 0.50 0.63
F Value 5.46 5.7 10.8
N 50 43 46
aVariables: per capita personal income in 1972 dollars (PINC); proportion of total generation from
hydro sources (RHG); kwh produced divided by net generating capacity (LF); cost of fossil fuel per
net kwh (FC); proportion of average ultimate customers that is residential (RRC); net generation per
kilowatt of installed generating capacity (nameplate) (RG); and dummy variable representing method
of commission selection (0 = elected, 1 = appointed) (COMM). The dependent variable is average
revenue per kwh for residential customers. The regression used for column I took the natural loga-
rithm of the variables described. RHG was used in place of LF in columns 2 and 3 for reasons
explained in note 33.
bThe 1973 data excluded those states which did not regulate electric utilities at the state level
(Minnesota, South Dakota, and Texas), and Nebraska, Tennessee, South Carolina and Virginia. The
last four states that were excluded were also omitted from the 1980 sample, either because they had
no privately owned utilities (Nebraska), one small privately owned utility (Tennessee) or because the
commissioners were elected by the legislature (South Carolina, Virginia).
CNumbers in parentheses are t-ratios.
*SOURCE: W. Crain & R. McCormick, Regulators as an Interest Group 33 (1978) (University of
Rochester, Working Paper Series No. 8004).
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Finally, re-estimation of the model developed by Pelsoci, 4 using 1980
data, 5 also suggests that the method of selection had no discernable effect
on the level of rates over different historical periods. Table 3 compares the
regression results for the residential average price equation obtained by
Pelsoci (column 1) with those for the re-estimation using 1980 data (col-
umn 2). The t-ratios for the variable COMM show that Pelsoci's original
conclusion continues to hold: The PUC selection method has no statisti-
cally significant effect on rates.
34. See Pelsoci, supra note 18, at 107. The Pelsoci model is specified as:
Pi = I(PINC, FC, CS, SU, PP, CA, COMM),
where Pi = average revenue per kwh for the ith customer class (only residential rates examined);
PINC = per capita personal income (in 1972 dollars); FC = cost of fossil fuel per net kwh; CS =
number of commissioners; SU = number of commission staff per privately-owned utility; PP =
proportion of total electricity sales made by publicly-owned utilities; CA = years since last major
reorganization of PUC (or age of commission); and COMM = dummy variable representing method
of selection (0 = elected, 1 = appointed). Id.
The data for the variables used in the re-estimation of the model came from the following sources:
for Pi, see 1980 ANNUAL, supra note 31, at 227-60; for PINC, see ABSTRACT, supra note 33, at 429,
table 715; for FC, see YEAR BOOK, supra note 33, at 35, table 26; for PP, see id. at 46-47, tables 41-
42; for CS, see SALOMON BROTHERS, INC., ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION-SEMIANNUAL REVIEW
12-21 (Feb. 11, 1983); for CA, see 1977 ANNUAL supra note 33, at 210-42; and for COMM, see
STATE ELECTRICITY PROFILES, supra note 4.
35. No published source containing accurate data on the number of professional and other em-
ployees disaggregated by public utility and motor carrier responsibilities was found by the author. For
this reason, the SU variable had to be dropped from the re-estimation.
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TABLE 3







































Including COMM 0.54 0.40
Excluding COMM - 0.39
F Value 6.5 4.4
N 47 46
'Variables: per capita personal income in 1972 dollars (PINC); cost of fossil fuel per net kwh (FC);
number of commissioners (CS); number of commission staff per privately-owned utility (SU); propor-
tion of total electricity sales made by publicly-owned utilities (PP); years since last major reorganiza-
tion of PUC (or age of commission) (CA); and dummy variable representing method of selection (0 =
elected, 1 = appointed) (COMM). The dependent variable is average revenue per kwh for residential
customers.
bNumbers in parentheses are t-ratios.
CStaff sizes of commissions broken down by public utility and motor carrier responsibilities are not
publicly available for all of the states.
*SOURCE: Pelsoci, Organizational Correlates of Utility Rates, in ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL IS-
SUES: THE MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 101, 108, table 6-1 (M. Steinman ed.
1979).
In sum, the regression results obtained from re-estimating all three
models with new data fail to support the hypothesis that elected commis-
sioners constrain the level of electricity rates. Some limited evidence for
1980 even indicates that elected commissioners may have caused an in-
crease in the level of electricity rates."
36. In most of the other regression results, the sign of the dummy variable (i.e. the method of
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B. Do Elected Commissions Favor Residential Customers?
Some who believe that the method of selection affects rates think that
one way elected PUCs provide lower rates to residential customers is by
discriminating against commercial and industrial consumers. Industrial
users, in particular, have strongly opposed the election of commissioners,
fearing that elected commissioners will face strong political incentives to
establish cross-subsidized rates favoring residential customers.37 For ex-
ample, a petition drive in Arkansas to include a constitutional amendment
requiring the election of public utility commissioners on the November
1982 ballot was defeated in a court action brought in part by industrial
electricity customers.3" These industrial consumers evidently believed they
would suffer economic losses if the commissioners were elected rather than
appointed. 9
Recent evidence, in addition to the regression results discussed above,
suggests that such fears are unjustified. Table 4 shows that, from 1973 to
1980, electricity prices to all three customer classses rose at similar rates
in states where commissioners are elected and in states where they are
appointed. For each category of states, the prices to industrial customers
had a materially higher growth rate than the prices to residential and
commercial customers. These data suggest three conclusions. First, elected
commissioners do not discriminate against industrial and commercial cus-
tomers any more than appointed commissioners do. Second, elected and
appointed PUCs may both discriminate against industrial users in favor of
commercial and residential users."' Finally, since the early 1970's, elected
PUCs have been no more successful than their appointed counterparts in
holding down electricity prices to residential customers.
selection) coefficient was negative (similar to the result shown in Table 1, column 2), indicating that
elected commissions as a group may have exerted an upward pressure on electricity rates in 1980.
37. See Industrial Users Wary of Electric Regulatory Reform, Energy User News, Apr. 25, 1983,
at 18: "Industrial users oppose elected commissions because of the highly politicized nature of regula-
tion under that method of selection. This is not to say that appointed commissions are apolitical; they
just don't seem to be as preoccupied with politics." (comments of Jay B. Kennedy, Executive Director
of Electricity Consumers Resource Council).
38. Arkansas High Court Axes Regulatory Reform Initiative from Fall Ballot, Electrical Wk.,
Oct. 4, 1982, at 3-4.
39. In November 1982, a referendum to elect public utility commissioners was placed on the
ballots in Michigan and Ohio. The electorate in each state voted against the election of commissioners.
Voters Reject Elected Commissions, Split on Pass-Alongs, Consumer Advocacy, Electrical Wk., Nov.
8, 1982, at 1-2. The voting results in Michigan and Ohio show that consumers do not necessarily
favor regulation that would supposedly favor them in the short-term at the expense of utility investors.
Consumers' preferences may be such that they do not favor "rate suppressive" policies by commis-
sions, whether they are appointed or elected.
40. The data, however, are far from conclusive on this point. For example, the higher rate of
growth in industrial prices may reflect changing cost conditions that affect industrial users more than
others. The data in the table were produced without controlling for these factors.
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TABLE 4
Growth Rates of Revenue Per KWH for the Period 1973-1980*
Elected Growth Rate Appointed Growth Rate
1973 1980 (Average Annual) 1973 1980 (Average Annual)
Average Residential Revenue
Per KWH (O/KWH) 2.31 4.58 10.3% 2.62 5.39 10.9%
Average Commercial Revenue
Per KWH (O/KWH) 2.35 4.65 10.2 2.50 5.30 11.3
Average Industrial Revenue
Per KWH (O/KWH) 1.26 3.19 14.2 1.40 3.79 15.3
*Excludes Florida, Minnesota, South Dakota and Texas. The Florida Public Service Commission
changed from appointed to elected commissioners in 1978. Minnesota did not initiate state regulation
until 1975. South Dakota and Texas did not commence state regulation until 1976.
SOURCES: Edison Electric Institute, Statistical Year Book of the Electric Utility Industry for 1973at
34, 46, tables 235, 375 (1974); EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK OF
THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY/1980 at 47, 60, tables 42, 60 (1981).
Additional evidence, presented in Tables 5 and 6, shows that states with
elected and appointed PUCs had similar rate structures for the years 1973
and 1980. In light of the arguments made by industrial electricity custom-
ers, one might expect lower ratios of residential to commercial and indus-
trial rate levels in states with elected PUCs. Data for investor-owned elec-
tric utilities (Table 5) appear to confirm this expectation, with the
exception that the 1980 average ratio of residential to industrial rates was
higher in states with elected PUCs. However, the difference in the mean
ratios has statistical significance (at the ninety-five percent level) only for
the 1973 ratio of residential to commercial average revenue.4' A compari-
son of typical bills for the residential and industrial customers of seventy-
two electric utilities (Table 6) shows that, although the rate structure is
more favorable to the residential class in states with elected commission-
ers, the differences in the average ratios only show statistical significance
(at the ninety percent level) for the large industrial (400,000 kwh - 1000
kw) and small residential (250 kwh) comparison.
41. The 1980 average ratios for the group of 82 electric utilities are comparable to those calcu-
lated from state data: the mean residential/commercial ratios were 0.987 and 1.023 for the utilities
regulated by elected and appointed commissions, respectively; the residential/industrial ratios were
1.462 and 1.419 for the utilities regulated by elected and appointed commissions, respectively. None of
the ratios was statistically significant at the 95% or 90% levels. See YEAR BOOK, supra note 33, at 47,
60, tables 42, 60.
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TABLE 5
Ratios of Average Revenue Per KWH
Year Selection Method Number of Statesa Mean Ratio
RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL
1973 Elected 9 0.987
Appointed 34 1.057
1980 Elected 9 0.994
Appointed 37 1.022
RESIDENTIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
1973 Elected 9 1.898
Appointed 34 1.933
1980 Elected 9 1.493
Appointed 37 1.451
a1973 data excludes Minnesota, South Dakota and Texas (see *, TABLE 4). Florida was classified
as an elected state for 1973.
SOURCES: EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUS-
TRY FOR 1973 at 34, 46, tables 235 and 375 (1974); EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, STATIS-
TICAL YEAR BOOK OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY/1980 at 47, 60, tables 42, 60
(1981).
TABLE 6
Ratios of Industrial to Residential Typical Monthly Bills*
Year Selection Method Number of Utilities Mean Ratio
Large Industrial (400,000 KWH-1000 KW) and Small Residential (250 KWH)
1980 Elected 12 882.0
Appointed 60 998.0
Large Industrial (400,000 KWH-1000 KW) and Medium Residential (500 KWH)
1980 Elected 12 508.5
Appointed 60 562.6
Large Industrial (400,000 KWH-1000 KW) and Large Residential (1000 KWH)
1980 Elected 12 292.3
Appointed 60 322.4
Small Industrial (60,000 KWH-150 KW) and Small Residential (250 KWH)
1980 Elected 12 154.7
Appointed 60 162.4
Small Industrial (60,000 KWH-150 KW) and Medium Residential (500 KWH)
1980 Elected 12 89.2
Appointed 60 91.3
*Typical monthly electric bills are not reported for the electric utilities which do not serve any city of
50,000 population or more. Typical bills that were selected are those published for the largest city
served by each utility.
SOURCE: ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, TYPICAL ELECTRIC BILLS
19-228, 263-79, tables 10, 18 (1981).
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Furthermore, the re-estimation of the Mann-Primeaux and the Crain-
McCormick models4 shows that the commission selection method had no
effect on the price of electricity for any consumer classes. If electing PUCs
has no effect on industrial, commercial, or residential electricity rates,
then it is obvious that elected PUCs have not structured rates in favor of
residential consumers any more than their appointed counterparts have.
There are two likely explanations for this result. First, contrary to pop-
ular belief, elected PUCs may not be more willing to redistribute wealth
from utility stockholders to customers, even if they had the discretion to do
so.43 Second, federal and state statutes and judicial interpretations of those
statutes may confront the elected PUCs with constraints and incentive
structures similar to those faced by their appointed counterparts. 4
The evidence, therefore, does not lend much support to the hypothesis
that elected PUCs establish rate structures which are significantly differ-
ent from those established by appointed PUCs. Indeed, it may be that
PUCs, whether elected or appointed, play a passive role in the determina-
tion of rate structures.
III. Explanations
The evidence presented in the preceding section strongly suggests that
the method of commissioner selection has no effect on residential electric-
ity rates. It also leads to two additional questions. The first is why we
observe lower electricity rates in states with elected commissions than in
states with appointed commissions."' A second, related question is why the
42. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
43. See infra text accompanying note 68 for a discussion of the financial pressures on elected
officials.
44. See, e.g. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of W. Va., 262
U.S. 679 (1923) (establishing criteria to guide PUCs in setting a fair rate of return); see also Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2627 (1978), which requires PUCs to consider,
and adopt if found appropriate, II ratemaking and regulatory standards for improving energy and
utility efficiency. In 14 states (two of which have elected PUCs) PUCs are prohibited from allowing
any construction work in progress (CWIP) in the rate base. See SALOMON BROTHERS, INC., supra
note 34, at 12-21.
A final possibility is that, during the time period considered, the increased electricity prices were
predominantly caused by certain market conditions unrelated to the selection method of PUCs. See
ELECTRICITY POLICY PROJECT, supra note 6, at 5-3. These market conditions (including inflation)
might obscure any effect that the PUC selection method might have on the rate structure. However,
these conditions would not obscure such an effect if the data were subjected to regression analysis, as
in the preceding section. See supra text accompanying notes 31-36. Thus, this explanation for the data
is probably incorrect.
45. One traditional hypothesis is that elected PUCs grant a smaller percentage of rate increase
requests than do appointed PUCs. Empirical evidence supports this theory. A sample of 291 electric
utility rate cases (representing the cases involving the sample of 82 utilities studied in this article)
decided by PUCs during the period from 1977 to 1982 (45 of which were in states with elected
PUCs), reveals a mean percentage (that is, increase granted as a fraction of increase requested) of
64.2% for appointed PUCs and 51.6% for elected PUCs. The amount of increase granted is that level
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investment commmunity's unfavorable ratings do not appear to exert up-
ward pressure on rates in states with elected PUCs.
A. The Rate Differential
The answer to the first question seems to lie in higher fuel costs, distri-
bution costs, and taxes in the states with appointed PUCs. The average
1980 steam power production cost per kwh was roughly fifty-three per-
cent higher for the electric utilities regulated by appointed PUCs."' A re-
view of fuel costs for December 1980 showed that these utilities pay ten
percent and twenty percent more for coal and natural gas, respectively.
4 7
In addition, the states with elected PUCs, on average, are more favorably
located near coal-producing regions.48 By contrast, electric utilities in
states with appointed PUCs generate a much higher percentage of their
electricity with oil-fired plants.4" Oil costs were more than 300% higher
than coal costs in 1980.0
Utilities located in states with appointed PUCs also face higher distri-
bution costs and taxes. In 1980, the average total production and distribu-
tion expenses for the sample of eighty-two electric utilities were 3.17
cents/kwh in the states with elected PUCs and 2.55 cents/kwh in the
states with appointed PUCs-a cost differential of 0.62 cents/kwh.51  At
designated in a commission's original rate order. Increases specified in final orders, pursuant to a
judicial remand of a commission's rate case order, are not included in the calculations. The difference
in means is statistically significant at the 95% level. The data in the sample came from Utility Indus-
try, Quarterly Regulatory Reports, issued by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., during the
years 1977 to 1982.
The question of whether the higher percentage can be attributed solely to the election of commis-
sioners requires further examination. In fact, utilities regulated by elected PUCs may have asked for
larger rate increases than utilities regulated by appointed PUCs (holding other things constant), antic-
ipating that the PUC would grant them a smaller percentage of their request. The fact that actual
rate increases granted since 1973, as shown earlier, were similar for the two types of PUCs, suggests
that this strategic behavior on the part of utilities regulated by elected PUCs may well occur. This
factor could explain the observed differential in the percentage of the requested rate relief granted.
46. See 1980 ANNUAL, supra note 31, at 265-366. Steam power production expense is mostly
made up of fossil fuel costs; however, steam power maintenance expenses are also included in the
measurement of steam fuel cost. The data were obtained for the 82 electric utilities in the sample used
for this article.
47. See ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY, Jan. 1981, at 103, 108, tables 64, 69 (prepared by Energy
Information Administration, U.S. Dep't of Energy) (Dec. 1980 data on cost of coal and gas by type of
purchase and by census region and state).
48. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, A
STUDY OF COAL PRICES 67 (Mar. 1976) (states with elected commissions are located near either the
western coal reserves or the Appalachian coal reserves).
49. See ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY, supra note 47, at 103-08, tables 64-69. The average per-
centage of total generation from oil-fired power plants (for Dec. 1980) was 2.9% and 20.3% for the
electric utilities located in the elected and appointed states, respectively.
50. See id. at 103, 105, tables 64, 66. These costs are measured in cents per unit of net generating
capacity.
51. See 1980 ANNUAL, supra note 31, at 120-187, 265-366.
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the same time, the differences in average rates for electric utilities located
in states with appointed PUCs and those located in states with elected
PUCs were 0.68 cents/kwh, 0.48 cents/kwh and 0.63 cents/kwh for the
residential, commercial, and industrial classes, respectively."a The rate dif-
ferentials, then, are very similar to the cost differential. It thus appears
that the lower average electric rates in the states with elected PUCs result
from more favorable cost conditions rather than from the regulatory activ-
ities of the elected PUCs.
B. Perceptions of the Regulatory Climate
An additional puzzle arises from the fact that cost differences seem to
explain completely the differences in rates between states with elected
PUCs and states with appointed PUCs. That fact appears inconsistent
with evidence that the regulatory climate under elected PUCs is less
favorable than that under appointed PUCs.5" An unfavorable regulatory
climate often coincides with higher costs of capital,54 which should be
reflected in a higher price for electricity. The present discussion first de-
scribes the criteria that investment houses use to categorize regulatory cli-
mates. It then suggests ways to resolve the apparent conflict between the
evidence of an unfavorable regulatory climate in states with elected PUCs
and the conclusion of Section II that the method of PUC selection has no
effect on utility rates.
The investment community generally regards elected PUCs with some
suspicion. Most states with elected PUCs fall within the "unfavorable
regulatory climate" category of the investment house classifications. 5 The
1982 rating of PUCs by Salomon Brothers, shown in Table 7, illustrates
this categorization: Six out of the nine states with elected PUCs received
unfavorable ratings, whereas only three out of the thirty-six states with
appointed PUCs received such a low rating.
52. See id. The average rates to the different classes of customers were also calculated from the
sample of 82 electric utilities.
53. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
55. This classification is based on Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, and Dubin-Navarro compos-
ite regulatory climate rankings. See MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., UTILITY IN-
DUSTRY-OPINIONS ON REGULATION (Sept. 1982); SALOMON BROTHERS, INC., ELECTRIC UTILITY
REGULATION (Aug. 16, 1982); Dubin & Navarro, supra note 27, at 144, table 7-1.
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TABLE 7
Regulatory Climate Rankings of Public
Utility Commissionsa
Favorable Indiana, Texas, Utah, Florida, North Carolina, Wisconsin, California, Hawaii,
Kentucky, New Mexico, New York, Ohio
Average Arizona (E), Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey,
Oregon, Vermont, Washington, Arkansas, Kansas, Maryland. Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oklahoma (E), South Carolina , Virginiab,
Wyoming, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Louisiana (E), Michigan, Pennsylvania
Unfavorable Georgia (E), Mississippi (E), Montana (E), North Dakota (E), Rhode Island,
South Dakota (E), West Virginia, Alabama (E), Missouri
aAn (E) after a state indicates that PUCs in that state are elected. PUCs in all other states are
appointed.
bIn South Carolina and Virginia, the legislature elects commissioners, thus making the classification
of selection method unclear.
SOURCE: SALOMON BROTHERS, INC., ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION 5, figure 4 (Aug. 16, 1982).
Given the unfavorable ratings, one wonders what specific types of poli-
cies and decisions by elected PUCs cause investment research firms to
view the regulatory climate in those states as generally unfavorable. The
criteria used by the investment houses to rank a regulatory climate include
the level of allowed rate of return on equity, the type of test year
used-i.e., future or historical-to calculate revenue requirements, the in-
clusion of construction work in progress in the rate base, the accounting
treatment of deferred taxes and investment tax credits, the existence of
fuel adjustment clauses, and the lapse of time between a rate filing and a
rate order decision (i.e., "regulatory lag").5 These criteria are weighed
subjectively to determine the "quality" and predictability of earnings. For
example, Merrill Lynch expressed concerns about several aspects of recent
56. A simple decisional model of a PUC's rate determination would look like this:
Revenue Requirement = Operating Costs + (Rate Base X Fair Return).
The revenue requirement is what the commission finds the utility needs. A utility's needs include an
ability to cover costs as well as the ability to earn a fair profit. Operating costs include such things as
labor, fuel, materials, and current depreciation expense. The rate base is the amount that the commis-
sion feels is the appropriate value for capital committed to the utility service. Fair return is the rate of
return that the commission has determined will yield investors in the utility a reasonable but not
monopolistic profit. Weiss, State Regulation of Public Utilities and Marginal-cost Pricing, in CASE
STUDIES IN REGULATION 262, 265 (L. Weiss & M. Klass eds. 1981).
The factors listed in the text can have a significant effect on profitability. Using a future rather
than a historical test year for determining operating costs increases the revenue requirement and
thereby increases rates. Including construction work in progress (CWIP) produces the same result. In
addition, fuel adjustment clauses allow rates to rise automatically. See id. at 265-270.
Obviously, the PUCs have to make several subjective judgments in making a rate increase decision.
Because the judgments are subjective, they permit criticism from the investment community, resulting
in the rankings for regulatory climate.
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rate case decisions by elected commissions.57 These included the failure to
recognize a completed plant in the rate base, the allowance of below aver-
age returns on equity,58 the influence of political factors in rate case or-
ders, and the unpredictability resulting from the necessity of resorting to
court action to win many of the rate increases."' In summary, the general
impression of investment analysts is that elected PUCs are more unpre-
dictable and allow lower rates of return on equity.
An examination of individual factors used by investment houses to mea-
sure the regulatory climate of PUCs provides some explanation for the
poor ratings of elected commissions. For example, the average allowed
rate of return on equity (using a sample of 291 electric rate cases since
1977) was higher to a statistically significant degree (at the ninety-five
percent level) in states with appointed PUCs: 14.51 percent for the states
with appointed PUCs compared with 13.92 percent for the states with
elected PUCs." °
If, as suggested by these data, the regulatory climate is more unfavora-
ble in states with elected PUCs, one would expect the cost of capital to be
higher in those states, ceteris paribus. In fact, the studies by Dubin and
Navarro conclude that an unfavorable rating would cause a significant
increase in the cost of capital.6 ' Credit scores calculated by Salomon
Brothers as of June 30, 1982, tend to confirm Dubin and Navarro's con-
clusion. The average credit standing of a sample of fifty-three electric util-
ities regulated by appointed PUCs was higher to a statistically significant
degree (at the ninety-five percent level) than that of a group of ten utilities
regulated by elected PUCs.62
It thus would appear that the unfavorable regulatory climate should, in
57. See MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., QUARTERLY REGULATORY REPORTS
(Dec. 1982).
58. But see Hagerman & Ratchford, supra note 21, at 54.
59. See MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., supra note 57, at 9-32.
60. See MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., UTILITY INDUSTRY, QUARTERLY
REGULATORY REPORTS, supra note 45.
61. In their "Summary and Conclusions" section Dubin and Navarro state:
Using a utility's M/B [market-to-book] ratio as a measure of its cost of equity capital, we
find conclusive evidence that an unfavorable regulatory climate (from an investor's point of
view) substantially increases the cost of equity capital. Our estimates show the M/B ratio falls
8 points and the cost of equity capital increases 228 basis points for the otherwise average
utility which moves from a more- to a less-favorable regulatory climate.
A complementary analysis of the effect of regulatory climate on bond ratings suggests that
moving the otherwise average utility from a very favorable to an unfavorable regulatory cli-
mate results in a bond derating of several steps.
Dubin & Navarro, supra note 27, at 160.
62. See SALOMON BROTHERS, INC., ELECTRIC UTILITY CREDIT AND BOND RATINGS (Oct. 14,
1982). Credit scores are determined using multivariate discriminant analysis. The credit standing
reflects the financial strength of an individual utility and provides a measure for the risk to the bond-
holder. It takes into account such factors as interest coverage, quality of earnings, and projected cash
flow.
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the long run, result in higher rates because of higher capital costs. This
extra cost, however, does not appear with any consistency in the regres-
sion results.
Several possible answers to this paradox come to mind. First, the in-
creased cost of capital actually may have been incorporated in electricity
rates. If this were true, the difference in production and distribution costs
between states with elected and appointed PUCs should be larger than the
difference between their rates. The cost differential and the rate differen-
tial match very well," however, suggesting that any rate increase due to
increased capital costs is not large enough to be apparent in the statistical
analysis."
Second, the "long run" may not have arrived. If utilities regulated by
elected PUCs have not had to raise substantial amounts of outside capital,
then the increased cost of capital would not appear in their rates. This
explanation probably is not correct, though, because utilities relied heavily
on the capital markets in the early 1970's." A third and more plausible
possibility, somewhat related to the second, is that the elected PUCs are
aware of the higher capital costs faced by their utilities, but have deferred
the ultimate effect of these increased costs by not permitting rate increases.
Under this scenario, the elected PUCs eventually will have to allow
recognition of these cost increases in electric rates; the only alternative will
be bankruptcy for the affected utilities.
A final possibility is that the investment analysts are wrong, that is,
states with elected PUCs may not have genuinely unfavorable regulatory
climates. This explanation is also plausible because the evidence on the
effect of the PUC selection process on the rate of return on equity-a
major factor in determining the favorableness of the regulatory climate-is
not clear." Thus, although there are plausible explanations, it is impossi-
ble to determine with certainty why the negative view of the investment
community toward elected PUCs is not reflected in the data.
Conclusion
This Article initially examined whether the historical evidence supports
the proposition that election of state public utility commissioners leads to
63. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
64. The initial impact of the change to an unfavorable regulatory climate is absorbed by the
holders of equity capital at the time of the change.
65. See D. SCOTT, FINANCING THE GROWTH OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 67 (1976).
66. Compare Hagerman & Ratchford, supra note 21, at 54 (whether or not commissioners are
elected does not affect the allowed return on equity) with supra text accompanying notes 58-59 (citing
elected commissions for below average returns on equity) and supra text accompanying note 27 (unfa-
vorable regulatory climate associated with low return on equity).
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lower electricity prices. Some of the studies reviewed in Section I provided
weak evidence that elected PUCs do tend to produce lower electricity
prices. Re-estimation of the models used in these earlier studies using
more recent data, however, reinforces the findings of other studies which
reached the opposite conclusion. The latter studies showed that demand
and supply conditions, rather than the process for selecting commissioners,
fully explain the differences in electricity prices between states where
commissioners are elected and states where they are appointed.
Although the evidence presented here leaves several unanswered ques-
tions,6 7 it seriously undermines the contentions of those who favor elected
PUCs on the grounds that they improve consumer welfare. It suggests
that elected commissioners may not support policies that are in the inter-
est of small ratepayers. The intense pressures placed on legislatures and
regulatory agencies by producers and other groups with large financial
interests in regulatory outcomes may partly explain why the method of
selecting commissioners has little or no effect on electricity prices.68 For
example, the electric utility industry may contribute large amounts of
money to election campaigns and give other support to commissioners
sympathetic to its economic interests.69 Moreover, the evidence also shows
that rate structures are similar in the two groups of states. Elected PUCs
do not appear to have improved the economic welfare of residential cus-
tomers at the expense of other consumer classes.
In summary, it probably makes little difference to the average ratepayer
whether a PUC is elected or appointed. If anything, elected commissions
may cause electricity rates to rise in the long run because they tend to
create at least the appearance of an unfavorable regulatory climate. With-
out other reasons for changing the method of selecting regulators, this evi-
dence argues for maintaining the status quo. Any change would entail
substantial implementation costs-including the cost of establishing elec-
67. First, the discrepancy between the results obtained from the new data and the original results
obtained by Mann and Primeaux, and Crain and McCormick is puzzling. In addition, there is a
possibility that the method of selecting commissioners affects non-price attributes of electricity service,
such as dependability. A more complete explanation for the unfavorable regulatory climate in states
with elected PUCs also is needed.
68. See, e.g., M. COHEN & G. STIGLER, CAN REGULATORY AGENCIES PROTECT CONSUMERS?
(1971).
69. In 1978, during the controversy over changing the Florida Public Utility Commission from an
elected body to an appointed one, proponents of an appointed commission argued that utilities had
heavily funded campaigns for the election of commissioners. See C. Radatz, Public Service Commis-
sions Today 12 (Jan. 1979) (paper prepared for the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau).
Former Governor Askew of Florida supported an appointed commission because he felt it was
.. necessary to maintain orderly economic growth patterns for the state and to avoid the instability
of elected commissions that in the future might stoop to the demagoguery of pandering to one or
another segment of the society." Gov. Askew Manages Revamp of PSC-Expands It and Makes It
Appointive, Electrical Wk., June 19, 1978, at 5.
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tion procedures, the cost of running the elections, and the cost of election
campaigns-without producing any apparent benefits.

